The Path to A Pyrrhic Victory for PRC
Part 1: Myanmar, Pipelines, and PRC's Southwestern Border
BLUF
A point of major vulnerability for PRC that has been lost in the Taiwan noise is the nation's strategic vulnerability to disruption of the Myanmar LNG/crude oil twin pipelines that run from MM's Rakhine province to the Yunnan Province of PRC.
BACKGROUND
Myanmar (iso code "MM") is in the third year of a renewed phase in its violent and long-running civil war, with the military junta (Tamtatdaw) teetering on the brink of collapse in the wake of a successful insurgency mounted by various indigenous rebel groups. PRC has long supported the junta as a proxy and invested significant capital into MM as a critical node in Belt and Road. However, PRC's hopes for the junta maintaining control of affairs in MM are all but at an end. Attacks all over the country are escalating in both scale and effectiveness, with the junta. Rakhine Province has not been spared. PRC has attempted to tamp down fears of disruption to MM operations, but has relatively influence overall on the end state.
The pipeline operations are intended to backstop disruption to maritime imports of energy commodities should the Strait of Malacca or South China Sea become denied transport corridors for PRC. The LNG pipeline, when at full capacity, can meet up to 15% of PRC's LNG needs, with the only other major pipeline sources coming into the northern reaches of the country from Central Asia (Turkmenistan/Kazakhstan) and Russia. PRC is the largest LNG importer in the world, with 55% of its offtake being in the industrial sector, rather than as an input into electricity production (3% of LNG consumption).
PRC's other major LNG import sources are either maritime-dependent (Australia, Qatar, Indonesia, Malaysia, USA) or pipeline-fed into the northern parts of the country (Turkmenistan, Russia, Kazakhstan). Of these various origins, only the northern pipelines seem most secure. In a contested maritime logistics scenario sprawling from Singapore to Korea, PRC's maritime import capacity will be severely constrained, with AU/ID/US guaranteed to cut off access to LNG for PRC and QA/MY finding themselves on the outside looking in at how to navigate difficult geopolitical and maritime chokepoints.
The crude oil pipeline, which offtakes product from Saudi Arabia and other Middle East sources, can handle up to 4-5% of PRC's total crude oil import needs and is the major pipeline source for refined fuel/co-product capacity in southern PRC. Though PRC has ascended to the top spot globally in refined fuel production, sourcing of inputs remains a massive vulnerability that US and allied forces are likely to lean into should PRC escalate hostilities in the Pacific Rim. Previous attacks on the pipeline have triggered outrage and fear in PRC leadership, reflecting its strategic value to the Chinese Communist Party and PLA.
Should PRC lose these pipelines due to being targeted by the rebels or become a secondary casualty of rapidly-escalating IED/drone strikes, it would immediately become a major, unexpected constraint for PRC as it focuses its attention on pressuring Taiwan. Further, it would have a disruptive effect for the junta, who is still importing fuel with PRC support despite sanctions on the regime. It cannot be overstated how important it is to PRC's near-future ambitions that Myanmar be restabilized under junta control. [The junta, for their side, are resorting to their sadly common war-crime tactics of bombing, attacking, and repressing various ethnic and religious minorites in a desperate bid to pressure rebel forces into standing down.] If the US and her allies are to take the threat of PRC hostilities against Taiwan, the US, and regional allies seriously, the full scope of overt, covert, and deniable options must be carefully examined to maximize impact to the adversary while mitigating unnecessary casualties to the civilians and countries inevitably caught up in PRC's aggression and support of war crimes.
POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION
[NOTE: While the following are by no means comprehensive - and importantly are in no way representative of direct or indirect knowledge of the US Department of Defense's internal deliberations or boundaries - there has been little open discourse on what, exactly, can be potentially be done to deny PRC this valuable supply chain capability in Myanmar.]
Prepositioning and Show of Force - It is quite likely that the US will eventually have to pull Navy and Marine assets from the Middle East in the near future to increase our already growing presence in the Indopacific theater. Deploying a carrier strike group and/or amphibious ready group much closer to Myanmar as a contingency capability to defend civilian lives in Myanmar and defend western sea lines of communication would send a clear message of support for the rebel factions while serving larger strategic goals.
Overt Action and Peacekeeping - The US, Australia, UK, and others with skin in this game have numerous battle-hardened, skilled units who excel at seizing, holding, and controlling assets and terrain. Should PRC continue its pattern of escalatory belligerence in the Pacific Rim, a limited two-phase operation could be undertaken to seize the port and energy infrastructure in Rakhine Province with follow-on forces deployed to stabilize the province for civilian populations.
Limited Action - Given the relative proximity to the US' "Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier" at Diego Garcia, the US and allies are capable of deploying a range of limited, active measures to disrupt and distract PRC via Myanmar. This would also have the subtle benefit of leveraging the base even as PRC's own covert diplomatic efforts to undermine the US and UK's claims to "Dodge" remain ongoing.
Irregular Warfare - Should PRC escalate to open kinetic conflict against the US and our Pacific Rim allies, the playbook opens up tremendously for all manner of conventional and...ungentlemanly...tactics. PRC is extremely vulnerable to sabotage and other forms of shaping operations in, adjacent to, and via Myanmar. From access to critical minerals to hydroelectric power generation to impacting PRC's critical industrial regions in the southern mainland to interdicting the narcotics cartels in Shan State who are tacit allies of the PLA/CPC, exploiting the Myanmar/PRC border would be a powerful tit-for-tat stratagem against PRC in response to its own efforts to exploit the US' southern border.
CONCLUSION
Though much ink has been spilled by fretful think tanks and Pentagon leadership over PRC's likely advantages in a conventional (albeit omnidomain) conflict with the US and her allies in the Pacific Rim, it is likewise worth remembering that the US is a nation that has the assets, reach, and capability to strike unexpectedly in the most unconventional and powerful ways from across the world. PRC, for all its industrial might and likely exploitation of the US' vulnerabilities in our own homeland, must be reminded that if it calls down the thunder, the US and its allies are willing and able at any time to hoist the black flag and begin slitting throats.
Dum spiro spero,
RK
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